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Dissociations between similarity and categorization have 
constituted critical counter-evidence to the view that 
categorization is similarity-based.  However, there have 
been difficulties in replicating such dissociations.  This 
paper reports three experiments.  The first provides 
evidence of a double dissociation between similarity and 
categorization.  The second and third show that by 
asking participants to make their judgments from 
particular perspectives, this dissociation disappears or is 
much reduced.  It is argued that these data support a 
perspectival view of concepts, in which categorization is 
similarity-based, but where the dimensions used to make 
similarity and categorization judgments are partially 
fixed by perspective. 
Introduction 
Explanations of categorisation have undergone a 
number of theoretical shifts (Medin, 1989), from 
classical to prototype models, and from prototype to 
theory-based models (e.g., Murphy & Medin, 1985).  
One of the key pieces of evidence against similarity-
based models has been the finding that similarity and 
categorisation judgments can dissociate.  For example, 
Rips (1989) found that participants judged an unknown 
item more similar to a coin yet more likely to be a 
pizza; and a bird transformed to look like an insect as 
more similar to an insect, yet more likely to be a bird. 
Dissociations between similarity and categorization 
judgments appear directly to undermine similarity-
based models of categorization.  Prototype models, for 
example, assume that categorisation involves a 
similarity comparison between an object and a 
prototype in memory (e.g., Hampton, 1995).  Exemplar-
based models assume that a similarity comparison is 
made between an object and sets of exemplars in 
memory (e.g., Kruschke, 1992).  In both kinds of 
model, categorization is taken to be a monotonic 
increasing function of similarity.  That is, according to 
similarity-based models, it should not be possible for 
categorization to increase without a corresponding 
increase in similarity.  These models thus deny the 
possibility of two kinds of phenomena: i) a decrease in 
categorization accompanied by an increase in 
similarity; and ii) a decrease in categorization 
accompanied by no change in similarity. 
In spite of the evidence and arguments in support of 
similarity-categorisation dissociations (henceforth, 
SCD), similarity-based models have maintained their 
appeal.  Some of this can be attributed to the apparent 
success of similarity-based models in explaining much 
categorization data (cf. Hampton, 1998) even if SCDs 
remain as recalcitrant cases.  But similarity-based 
models have also retained their appeal because the 
existence of SCDs has been questioned (despite other 
apparent demonstrations – e.g., Kroska & Goldstone, 
1996; Roberson, Davidoff & Braisby, 1999).  Smith & 
Sloman (1994), in seeking to replicate Rips’ results, 
were able only to produce a SCD when participants 
were required to operate in a reflective, rule-based 
mode, by giving a concurrent.  Similarly, Estes & 
Hampton (2002) only obtained a SCD when using a 
within-participants design; a between-participants 
design failed to show a dissociation.  In contrast, 
Thibaut, Dupont & Anselme (2002) obtained SCDs in 
two experiments.  Their participants were required to 
learn two artificial categories, exemplars of which were 
novel shapes.  They found that participants tended to 
judge category membership according to the presence 
of a necessary feature, but similarity according to the 
presence of a salient characteristic feature. 
Thibaut et al.’s results show that SCDs can arise 
without participants entering a reflective mode of 
categorization.  However, it does not demonstrate that 
natural (as opposed to artificial) categories give rise to 
SCDs.  That is, they have shown that participants can 
learn and use non-similarity-based categories, but not 
that natural categories are not similarity-based. 
This paper seeks to add to this debate concerning 
SCDs and, more widely, similarity-based models of 
concepts by i) attempting to demonstrate a double 
similarity-categorisation dissociation; and ii) showing 
that such dissociations can be eliminated or diminished. 
Previous work (e.g., Thibaut et al.) has shown that 
stimuli defined by the presence of both necessary and 
characteristic features may be categorized according to 
the necessary feature, and rated for similarity according 
to the characteristic feature.  Of course, such work also 
implies the existence of two kinds of (potentially) 
borderline case: (a) an exemplar possessing the 
necessary but not the characteristic feature (N+C−); and 
(b) an exemplar possessing the characteristic but not the 
necessary feature (N−C+).  According to the rationale 
extended by Thibaut et al., exemplar (a) should receive 
a high categorisation but low similarity rating, and (b) 
should receive a low categorization but high similarity 
rating.  Together these borderline cases could provide a 
double dissociation, and potentially more robust 
evidence of SCDs. 
This paper also seeks to establish whether SCDs are 
context-sensitive.  That is, it is possible that in context, 
categorization judgments are similarity-based, but that 
dissociations arise when categorization and similarity 
judgments are elicited in the absence of any specific 
context.  If so, then the mixed evidence reported in the 
literature may stem from minor variations in task 
presentation, and it might be possible to retain a 
similarity-based model in which the weighting of 
features varies with context. 
Experiment 1 
This experiment sought to establish whether similarity 
and categorization judgments for biological categories 
dissociate for two kinds of borderline case: 
Appearance+Genetics− and Appearance−Genetics+. 
Design 
Task (Typicality, Categorisation), Appearance (A+,A−) 
and Genetics (G+,G−) were within-participants factors. 
Method 
Participants 40 undergraduate psychology students 
attending an Open University residential school 
volunteered to participate. 
 
Materials Four food categories were chosen based on 
previous work (Braisby, 2001): salmon, apple, potato 
and chicken.  Sixteen scenarios were constructed, as 
described below, so that there were four exemplars per 
category defined by the presence or absence of 
appearance and genetic properties: A+G+; A+G−; 
A−G+; and A−G−.  The following shows how scenarios 
were constructed for the category ‘apple’; the first set of 
brackets indicates wordings for G+ and G− conditions, 
and the second set indicates the A+ and A− wordings. 
“You have just bought an apple from a reputable 
retailer.  On examining its packaging closely, you find 
that it has been genetically modified [but it retains 
ALL/so that it has NONE] of the genetic properties 
specific to apples.  On closer examination, you find that 
it [looks, feels, smells and even tastes JUST/does NOT 
look, feel, smell or even taste] like an apple.” 
 
Procedure All scenarios were presented and responses 
recorded using E-prime (Schneider, Eschman & 
Zuccolotto, 2002). Participants were given a practice 
example, and then asked to read the 16 scenarios.  After 
each, participants first judged the category membership 
of the exemplar given the category label (e.g., apple), 
choosing either a Yes or No judgment.  They then rated 
the exemplar for typicality on a 7-point scale relative to 
the category label.  The typicality question is taken to 
be an index of similarity (cf. Hampton, 1998).  Order of 
presentation of scenarios was random. 
Results 
Responses to the categorization question were summed 
over the four categories, yielding a scale of 0 to 4; the 
typicality question was transformed to the same scale 
(high scores imply high typicality and high 
categorization probability). Both typicality and 
categorization scores were analysed using ANOVA 
with Task (Typicality, Categorisation), Appearance 
(+,−) and Genetics (+,−) all within-participant factors. 
There was no effect of Task (p = 0.61), but main 
effects of Appearance [F(1,39) = 149.29, p < 0.001; η2 
= 0.79] and Genetics [F(1,39) = 109.59, p < 0.001; η2 = 
0.74], interactions between Task and Appearance 
[F(1,39) = 14.30, p < 0.01; η2 = 0.27], Task and 
Genetics [F(1,39) = 11.63, p < 0.01; η2 = 0.23], 
Appearance and Genetics [F(1,39) = 21.17, p < 0.001; 
η
2
 = 0.35], all subsumed by a marginal three-way 
interaction between Task, Appearance and Genetics 
[F(1,39) = 3.88, p = 0.06; η2 = 0.09].  The key 
interactions between Appearance and Genetics, and 
between Task, Appearance and Genetics, are shown in 
Figures 1, and 2 and 3 respectively. 
Pair-wise comparisons were conducted to examine 
the locus of the three-way interaction between Task, 
Appearance and Genetics.  There was no effect of Task 
for either of the clear cases, i.e., either the A−G− or the 
A+G+ cases.  However, there was an effect of Task, 
though in opposite directions, for the two borderlines.  
For the A+G− case, Typicality scores were markedly 
higher than Categorisation scores (Typicality = 1.93, 
categorization = 1.03, t(39) = 3.21, p < 0.01) while for 
the A−G+ case, Typicality scores were markedly lower 












Figure 1. Overall ratings by Appearance and 
Genetics. 
categorisation = 1.65, t(39) = 2.69, p < 0.05). 
Both Thibaut et al. and Estes & Hampton found that 
SCDs were due to only a subset of participants 
dissociatin their judgments.  To examine this 
possibility, the number of times each participant gave 
dissociated pairs of judgments for the borderline items 
was calculated.  A dissociated pair of judgments was 
defined in terms of differences between typicality and 
categorization responses for two borderline items 
within the same category, where the differences in the 
scores have different sign.  For example, a participant 
might rate an A+G− as more typical than an A−G+, but 
categorise the former negatively and the latter 
positively.  Though the difference in typicality scores is 
positive, the difference in categorization will be 
negative.  Dissociations were also defined to include 
cases where participants gave differing categorization 
responses to the two borderlines within the same 
category, but gave the same typicality judgments.  Each 
of these types of dissociation undermines the suggestion 
that categorization is a function of similarity. 
Of the 40 participants, 25 (63%) gave no dissociated 
pair of judgments to the four pairs of borderlines with 
which they were presented; however, 5 (13%) gave 
dissociated judgments to all four pairs of borderlines. 
Discussion of Experiment 1 
Although previous research has claimed evidence of 
such dissociations, largely these have been single 
dissociations, i.e., items for which categorization points 
to category A and similarity to category B.  In contrast, 
the present research dissociates these judgments in two 
ways.  First, for A+G− items, typicality scores are 
higher than their corresponding categorization scores.  
For A−G+ items, typicality scores are lower than the 
corresponding categorization scores.  Moreover, A+G− 
items are judged more typical than A−G+ items (1.93 
and 0.83 respectively, t(39) = 3.94, p < 0.001); yet 
A+G− items are judged less likely to be in the category 
than A−G+ items (1.03 and 1.65 respectively, t(39) = 
1.73, p = 0.09).  Taken together, these findings present 
a challenge for similarity-based models, for it should 
not be possible for an item A to be more typical than 
item B and yet less likely to be a category member than 
item B. 
It should also be noted that these materials do not 
present participants with fantastical transformations or 
discoveries.  Nor do they tap artificial categories.  
Moreover,  these data do not provide support for the 
idea that dissociations arise only under an especially 
reflective mode of categorisation.  Response times were 
collected for both typicality and categorisation 
judgments.  Typicality is often taken to be an index of 
an initial similarity computation, which can be over-
ridden by a subsequent reflective categorisation.  
However, the response times in this experiment provide 
no support for this thesis: typicality response times 
averaged 5.13 seconds (including the time taken to read 
each scenario), yet categorisation averaged 3.86 
seconds (again including reading time), a statistically 
significant difference [t(39) = 5.40, p < 0.001]. 
Lastly, though, it should be noted that the 
dissociations arise because of a subset of the 
participants, corroborating the findings of Estes & 
Hampton, and Thibaut et al. 
In spite of not supporting similarity-based models, 
there is the possibility that categorisation and similarity 
judgments may align in context.  That is, when in a 
specific context, it may be that participants make 
similarity-based categorisations, and dissociations arise 
only because these judgments are elicited out of 
context. The next two experiments sought to investigate 
this possibility by eliciting judgments in contexts 


























Figure 3. Categorisation ratings by Appearance 
and Genetics. 
 
properties.  Both require participants to adopt a 
perspective in making their categorisation and typicality 
judgments (cf. Barsalou & Sewell, 1984) 
Experiment 2 
This experiment sought to establish whether similarity 
and categorization judgments dissociate for the two 
kinds of borderline, A+G− and A−G+, when 
participants are asked to adopt a perspective that 
emphasizes appearance properties. 
Design 
Task (Typicality, Categorisation), Appearance (A+,A−) 
and Genetics (G+,G−) were within-participants factors. 
 
Participants 33 undergraduate psychology students 
attending an Open University residential school 
volunteered to participate. 
 
Materials The same categories in experiment 1 were 
used.  Scenarios were as in experiment 1, but were 
prefaced by the clause “Imagine that you are a 
Sculptor…”.  It was assumed, based on previous work, 
that participants would take this profession to signal the 
enhanced relevance of appearance properties. 
 
Procedure An identical procedure to experiment 1 was 
followed.  However, categorization and typicality 
questions were prefaced by the clause “Imagining 
yourself to be a sculptor…”. 
Results 
Responses to the categorization and typicality questions 
(transformed as before) were analysed using ANOVA 
with Task (Typicality, Categorisation), Appearance 
(+,−) and Genetics (+,−) as within-subject factors. 
There was no effect of Task (p = 0.96), but main 
effects of Appearance [F(1,32) = 325.18, p < 0.001; η2 
= 0.91] and Genetics [F(1,32) = 35.30, p < 0.001; η2 = 
0.53], interactions between Task and Genetics [F1,32) = 
6.82, p < 0.05; η2 = 0.18] and between Appearance and 
Genetics [F(1,32) = 4.23, p < 0.05; η2 = 0.12].  
However, there was no three-way interaction between 
Task, Appearance and Genetics (p = 0.20).  The 
interaction between Appearance and Genetics is shown 
in Figure 4. 
Although no three-way interaction was found, pair-
wise comparisons were performed to examine the 
possibility that there might be differences between the 
Tasks for the two borderline items (since these were the 
source of the three-way interaction in experiment 1).  
Unlike experiment 1, there was no effect of Task for the 
A−G+ borderline, though there was a marginal effect 
for the A+G− borderline (Categorisation = 2.64, 
typicality = 3.17, t(32) = 2.03, p = 0.05). 
As before, the response patterns of individual 
participants were examined to see how many gave 
dissociated judgments.  Of the 33 participants, 23 
(70%) gave no dissociated pair of judgments to the four 
pairs of borderlines with which they were presented; no 
participants gave dissociated judgments to all four pairs 
of borderlines. 
Discussion of Experiment 2 
Unlike experiment 1, these results provide no evidence 
of a dissociation between categorisation and similarity 
judgments.  That is, the dissociation appears to have 
been eliminated by ensuring participants give their 
judgments from a specific perspective or context.  The 
pairwise comparisons support this interpretation.  
Critically, the typicality and categorization scores do 
not violate the assumptions of similarity-based models: 
both A+G− and A−G+ cases differ in categorisation 
(2.64 and 0.94 respectively, t(32) = 4.29, p < 0.001) but 
also in typicality (3.17 and 0.56 respectively, t(32) = 
10.12, p < 0.001).  Hence the borderlines here do not 
provide evidence of dissociation – the increase in 
categorization is matched by an increase in typicality. 
Experiment 3 seeks to establish whether the salience 
of genetic properties can be enhanced sufficiently to 
eliminate the dissociation in experiment 1. 
Experiment 3 
This experiment sought to establish whether similarity 
and categorization judgments dissociate for the two 
kinds of borderline, A+G− and A−G+, when 
participants are asked to make adopt a perspective that 
emphasizes genetic or biological properties. 
Design 
Task (Typicality, Categorisation), Appearance (A+,A−) 
and Genetics (G+,G−) were within-participants factors. 
 












Figure 4. Overall ratings by Appearance and Genetics 
under a ‘Sculptor’ perspective. 
 
attending an Open University residential school 
volunteered to participate. 
 
Materials The same categories in experiment 1 were 
used.  Scenarios were as in experiment 1, but were 
prefaced by the clause “Imagine that you are a 
Biologist…”.  It was assumed, based on previous work, 
that participants would take this profession to signal the 
enhanced relevance of biological properties. 
 
Procedure An identical procedure to experiment 1 was 
followed.  However, categorization and typicality 
questions were prefaced by the clause “Imagining 
yourself to be a biologist…”. 
Results 
Responses to the categorization and typicality questions 
(transformed as before) were analysed using ANOVA 
with Task (Typicality, Categorisation), Appearance 
(+,−) and Genetics (+,−) as within-subject factors. 
The pattern of results from the ANOVA exactly 
replicates that of experiment 2.  There was no effect of 
Task (p = 0.53), but main effects of Appearance 
[F(1,33) = 84.28, p < 0.001; η2 = 0.72] and Genetics 
[F(1,33) = 125.02, p < 0.001; η2 = 0.79], an interaction 
between Task and Genetics [F(1,33) = 13.93, p < 0.01; 
η
2
 = 0.30] and between Appearance and Genetics 
[F(1,33) = 7.86, p < 0.01; η2 = 0.19].  As in experiment 
2, there was no three-way interaction between Task, 
Appearance and Genetics. The interaction between 
Appearance and Genetics is shown in Figure 5. 
As in experiment 2, although no three-way 
interaction was found, pair-wise comparisons were 
performed to examine the possibility that there might be 
differences between the Tasks for the two borderline 
items. As before, there was no effect of Task for the 
A−G+ borderline, but an effect of Task for the A+G− 
borderline (Categorisation = 1.03, typicality = 1.72, 
t(34) = 2.51, p < 0.05). 
19 participants (54%) gave no dissociated pair of 
judgments to the four pairs of borderlines with which 
they were presented; only 1 (3%) participant gave 
dissociated judgments to all four pairs of borderlines. 
Discussion of Experiment 3 
As in experiment 2, this experiment suggests that the 
dissociation between categorization and similarity 
judgments reported in experiment 1 can be eliminated 
when judgments are given under a specific perspective. 
While the pairwise comparisons support this 
interpretation, other comparisons suggest that the 
perspective has not exerted such a strong influence in 
this experiment as in experiment 2.  Overall, the 
typicality scores do not differ significantly for the two 
borderlines cases, A+G− and A−G+ (1.72 and 1.71 
respectively, p = 0.96); however, the two borderlines do 
differ in their categorization scores: 1.03 and 2.09 
respectively, t(34) = 2.55, p < 0.05).  Hence the 
borderlines in this experiment provide evidence 
contrary to similarity-based models, i.e., an increase in 
categorization is not matched by an increase in 
similarity.  Nevertheless, relative to experiment 1, the 
perspective has served to eliminate the differences in 
typicality between the borderlines, even though 
differences in categorization remain. 
General Discussion 
This paper provides evidence to support two main 
claims.  The first is that similarity and categorization 
judgments dissociate for natural categories.  The second 
is that such dissociations are perspective-dependent. 
The data in experiment 1 reflect a double dissociation 
between similarity and categorization judgments, and 
serve to undermine similarity-based models of 
categorization.  Though previous research has also 
uncovered dissociations, these have been single 
dissociations, and there have been difficulties in 
replicating those findings.  Indeed, suggestions have 
been made that such dissociations arise only when 
categorization is highly reflective, only when designs 
are within-participant, and only for certain participants. 
The data reported here contradict the first of these 
claims.  That is, the categorization judgments obtained 
in these experiments have not been sought under a 
reflective mode – indeed response times show that 
participants take considerably less time to make these 
judgments than they do the corresponding typicality 
judgments.  So, there is little evidence for these 
categorization judgments being particularly reflective. 
These data confirm previous findings that 
dissociations arise because of a minority of participants.  












Figure 5. Overall ratings by Appearance and 
Genetics under a ‘Biologist’ perspective. 
 
only arise in within-participant designs, although 
Thibaut et al.’s evidence contradicts such a claim.  
However, Thibaut et al.’s study arguably shows only 
that people can learn artificial categories for which 
similarity and categorization dissociations arise, not that 
these arise also for natural categories.  This study 
appears to provide strong evidence that even for 
everyday, natural kind categories such dissociations 
arise.  Moreover, the work presented here does not rely 
on identifying features that could be considered 
necessary or characteristic, a problem Thibaut et al. 
identify in previous work – indeed, the stimuli used 
here are defined without reference to particular features. 
The second main claim is that by fixing perspective, 
dissociations between similarity and categorization 
judgments are reduced or eliminated.  In experiment 2, 
making judgments from a ‘sculptor’ perspective 
eliminated the dissociation, whereas it was reduced in 
experiment 3. 
How might these findings of perspective-dependence 
be explained?  One possibility is that similarity-based 
models should be seen as models of categorization-in-
context.  Categorization and typicality judgments are 
often elicited out of context.  Without the constraint of 
context, participants may call on different kinds of 
information to make the two kinds of judgment.  In 
other words, models of categorization should first seek 
to model categorization-in-context and then attempt to 
explicate context-free categorization judgments.  One 
possibility for such a perspectival account of concepts 
allows that categorization is similarity-based, but that 
the current perspective fixes the relevant dimensions to 
be used in the similarity computation (Braisby, 1998). 
Another possible explanation is that in experiments 2 
and 3, dissociations do not appear because the 
instructions used for categorization and similarity do 
not elicit those judgments.  For example, it could be 
that both sets of instructions actually elicit a 
categorization judgment, and participants respond in the 
typicality task as best they can given that their judgment 
reflects a categorization, rather than an overt judgment 
of typicality.  However, such an explanation is fraught 
with problems – for example, if conventional 
instructions do not determine the kind of judgment 
people make, then there is no obvious basis for deciding 
whether any previous research has really elicited 
categorization or typicality judgments. 
In conclusion, the data reported here suggest that a 
simple similarity-based view of categorization is not 
right.  However, when context is fixed, then the 
similarity-based models may fare much better.  What is 
needed to augment such models is a mechanism by 
which the current perspective or context fixes the 
relevant dimensions on which categorizations and 
similarity judgments are made. 
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